Thursday, December 26, 2013

Infection found on ‘feedburner.com’

Recently, we have seen the websites of MySQL and PHP.net being compromised. We have also blogged about Google Code being used as a drop site for holding malicious code.  These instances clearly suggest that attackers are targeting popular websites and using them in their attacks as they are less likely to be blocked by URL filters. This time we found that Google acquired ‘FeedBurner’, which provides custom RSS feeds and management tools to users is hosting an infected page. We found that one of the pages on the sub-domain ‘feeds.feedburner.com’ is serving malicious JavaScript.  The JavaScript is obfuscated and contains an iFrame, which after execution, redirects the user to a malicious website. More information about this particular attack can be found in McAfee's description of threat JS/Exploit-Blacole.em.

Let’s look at the infection in detail.

URL: hxxp://feeds.feedburner.com/bileblog

The following shows the redirection trace when visiting the aforementioned URL.

Network Trace:  



The redirection chain above case is as follows:
hxxp://feeds.feedburner.com/bileblog (Drops JavaScript Trojan)
--> hxxp://rsnvlbgcba.ibiz.cc/d/404.php?go=1  (Intermediate Redirection)
--> hxxp://fukbb.com/

Let’s take a look at a beautified version of the obfuscated JavaScript Trojan code which is dropped:



JavaScript Trojan code generally contains two main sections. The first is the decoder routine (i.e JavaScript code which decodes the embedded payload) and the second is the payload itself. Generally attackers keep on tweaking the decoder routine and payload to evade security vendors.

The de-obfuscated version of the code above can be seen here:



The de-obfuscated code loads an iFrame into the victim’s browser, which is redirecting the user to ‘hxxp://rsnvlbgcba.ibiz.cc/d/404.php?go=1’, which in turn redirects it to ‘hxxp://fukbb.com/’.

The source code hosted at ‘hxxp://rsnvlbgcba.ibiz.cc/d/404.php?go=1’ is a simple redirect:

   

 Final re-directed page:



Currently, ‘hxxp://fukbb.com’ is not serving any malicious code but the reputation of this site is found to be suspicious (Refer the VT link below). The page could however be revived at some point in the future. ThreatLabZ informed FeedBurner about this infection on 12/26/2013.

VT Reports:
File scan for JavaScript Trojan code: 24/49
URL scan on ‘hxxp://rsnvlbgcba.ibiz.cc/d/404.php?go=1’ :  2/51
URL scan on ‘hxxp://fukbb.com/’ :  3/51

ZULU Report:
URL Scan on ‘hxxp://feeds.feedburner.com/bileblog’: 100/100

Similar instances of this infection have been found on ‘http://celebrityshowdown.net/?feed=rss2’, which is also an RSS feed management site. The following is the network trace seen when visiting this URL.



The redirection chain observed in this case is as follows:
hxxp://celebrityshowdown.net/?feed=rss2    
--> hxxp://rhtbjgw.ibiz.cc/?go=2
--> hxxp://fukbb.com/

For a detailed report about this infections check the urlQueryreport.

We continue to see similar infections using malicious JavaScript injected into legitimate sites to redirect users to malicious sites on a daily basis. Most of the time the infected sites haven’t specifically been targeted, but have become infected during larger attacks conducted using browser exploit kits designed to automate the infection of as many sites as possible. We advise our readers to use online URL scanning tools such as ZULU to perform scans on URLs when suspicious, regardless of a site’s perceived reputation.

- pradeep

Sunday, December 22, 2013

Analysis of ATN Live TV iOS App using ZAP

“As the Mobile Industry is moving so fast, so too do security and Privacy issues”
There has been rapid growth in the prevalence of mobile devices in last few years. Every day a new device is being launched and hence increasing the number of online transactions. BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) has further complicated the security challenges of enterprises as they’re now responsible for protecting data on devices that they don’t own. At the same time, mobile application developers are coding new apps every day, without focusing on security/privacy related issues.
In this Post we will focus on analyzing the ATN Live TV App for iOS using our own free service ZAP (Zscaler Application Profiler). If you aren’t familiar with ZAP, it’s a simple web application which allows anyone to quickly analyze the security/privacy issues of any iOS or Android app by dynamically inspecting the web traffic generated by the app. Please have a look at our previous blog post or video for more information.
Let’s begin.
App Name: ATN Live TV
Category: Entertainment




You will need to provide the APP URL and some fake credential to ZAP in order to analyze the traffic for security/privacy leaks.
Once you are done with this, you’ll need to set the proxy setting on your device to point to ZAP. Hit the Proxy Scan button and follow the instructions for setting the proxy on your particular device.
In this analysis, we found that ATN Live TV is leaking passwords and Email IDs.


As you can see, the Email ID and the MD5 hashed password is being transferred to the server via GET request using HTTP. While the password is hashed via MD5, you can see that the data is not transmitted in an encrypted (HTTPS) channel. While MD5 is a one-way hash, an attacker that was able to sniff this traffic, could perform a dictionary attack to retrieve the clear text password.
Here is the Final Risk Score Report of ATN Live TV app from ZAP.

 
Conclusion
With the explosion of mobile app development, we’re seeing an increase in data and privacy leaks. This is occurring for the same reason that we saw so many web application vulnerabilities a decade ago – there are many new developers entering the space but few have access to the tools and knowledge necessary to develop secure apps and apps are often published without an independent security audit.
These issues were reported to the developer on 20/12/2013.

Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Aurora exploit still floating ...

It's been around two years since Microsoft released a patch for the IE 0day famously known as the Aurora exploit (CVE-2010-0249). We had blogged about this in the past when it was first seen in the wild on the 'GOV.CN' domain. This vulnerability targets IE version 6. Despite the passage of time, we continue to find live exploits for this vulnerability. Recently, we found a new URL which is serving the Aurora exploit code.

Exploit URL: hxxp://www.artbridal.com/bizcodi/gm/news.html

Let's take a look at the exploit code being delivered.
 

The exploit is delivered via obfuscated JavaScript code, although the level of obfuscation is not very high. Some of the strings and JavaScript function names are been obfuscated. The following is a snapshot of the de-obfuscated code.


If you observe the first image, the SPAN tag holds an IMG tag on which the 'onload' event calls an event handler  function 'eve'. This in turn creates an event object called 'e1', using the 'document.createEventObject' method. Then, by using an '.innerHTML' property, it assigns a null string to SPAN object 'sp1', but instead, the 'sp1' object is removed. In the function 'eve', the freed object is referenced, causing memory corruption in the form of an access violation in IE. To exploit this condition, the exploit code uses a typical heap spray technique to load the shellcode into memory for the execution. When the shellcode is executed, it tries to download a malicious file from the URL 'hxxp://fly-tld.ru/w.php?f=47&e=3'.  For a more detailed analysis, you can refer to this blog.
To obtain the aforementioned URL, the PE executable file was formed and extracted from the shell code in the exploit. The EXE was then examined using a debugger to extract the URL as can be seen below.


This URL is down at the moment, so further post exploitation analysis was not possible.

Reports:
VT URL Scan on found URL : 4/51 detections.
VT File Scan on EXE formed from Shellcode: 27/41 detections.

Various other URLs that have been seen in the past with similar patterns - '/w.php?f=(\d){2}&e=(\d){1,2}' include:

hxxp://synergyledlighting.net/w.php?f=56&e=4
hxxp://nicesextubes.co/w.php?f=18&e=6 
hxxp://iplaecrcocee.com/w.php?f=26&e=2
hxxp://iplaecrcocee.com/w.php?f=26&e=2
hxxp://examine.arsb.co.uk/w.php?f=20&e=2
hxxp://exciting.simssocialcheat.com/w.php?f=22&e=2
hxxp://oyacromifh.com/w.php?f=26&e=2
hxxp://eteaescopr.com/w.php?f=26&e=2


The obvious reason behind attacking old CVE's is the belief of attackers, that there are still un-patched and outdated browser's out there on end user machines. Sadly, they're correct. To avoid such attacks we suggest updating browsers with latest patches and migrating to the most recent version of the browser. 

Stay updated, Stay Safe!

Pradeep

Monday, December 16, 2013

Dissection of Android malware MouaBad.P

In Zscaler’s daily scanning for mobile malware, we came across a sample of Android Mouabad.p. Lets see what is inside.

Application static info:
 Package name = com.android.service
Version name = 1.00.11
SDK   version: 7
Size: 40 kb

Permissions:
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.DEVICE_POWER
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS
  •  android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
  •  android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  •  android.permission.READ_SMS
  •  android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  •  android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
  •  android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  •  android.permission.INTERNE
  •  android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE

Used features:
  • android.hardware.telephony
  • android.hardware.touchscreen

Services:
  • com.android.service.MessagingService
  • com.android.service.ListenService

Receivers:
  •  com.android.receiver.PlugScreenRecevier
  •  com.android.receiver.PlugLockRecevier
  •  com.android.receiver.BootReceiver
  • com.android.receiver.ScreenReceiver

Virustotal scan:

Now Lets dissect the code.
This application is using telephony services as shown in the code as well as in static analysis. You can see the use of premium telephone numbers.
In this particular screenshot, you can see functions which are using phone services for making calls to the premium numbers in order to generate revenue as the numbers would be controlled by the attackers and earn a small payment for each call made.
Here you can see that the application is harvesting SIM card information.
This application also checks for mobile data and the WIFI network status to determine if Internet connectivity is available.
The code includes a hardcoded list of premium telephone numbers, which are all located in China.
                     
In this screenshot you can clearly see that application also keeps watch on the screen and keyguard status (on/off).
This screenshot clearly denotes that the application tries to send SMS to the premium rate numbers previously seen in the code. Forcing Android applications to initiate calls to premium phone numbers controlled by the attackers is a common revenue generation scheme that we see, particularly in Android application distributed in third party Android app stores.
Here you can see various function names which are suspicious such as call, dial, disableDataConnectivity, get call location, etc. These functions suggest that the application is also trying to keep watch on other phone calls too. Function getCallstate, endCall, Call, CancleMissedCallNotification Illustrates that the application tries to control phone call services.
The application installs itself silently. Once installed, no icon is observed for this app. Also shown in the previous screenshot is the fact that the application waits for the screen and keyguard events before triggering its malicious activity. It does all of the activity without user intervention. This allows the malware to function without a suspicious icon on the home screen that just one of  technique used by malware authors to evade its presence to the device owner.
From above screenshots, you can see that the application is using the XML listener service.  Also, in the second screenshot, you can see that the application is trying to create a URL by assembling various strings. This is likely command and control (C&C) communication sent to a master server. The parameter &imei denotes the harvesting of the phone's IMEI number for tracking the device.
In conclusion, this malware will defraud the victim by silently forcing the phone to initiate premium rate SMS billing to generate revenue. The application may give control to the author for monitoring or controlling phone calls.
Reference:

Dissection of Zertsecurity - Banking Trojan.

Zertsecurity is a well known banking Trojan based on phishing schemes targeting German Android users.  Lets see how it works.
After installing the application, it prompts the user for account and PIN numbers.
The application takes the values of the account and PIN numbers via input boxes and saves them to the cfg.txt file. It then sends this file to a remote command and control (C&C) server master.
You can see the hardcoded C&C server in the application.
Also here you can see that the application is also asking for SMS receive permissions. It receives SMS messages from it's C&C server for commands to perform malicious activities. It also checks for the string “&Sign28tepXXX” in order to identify commands from the C&C server.
Here you can see that the application is using AES and BASE64 encoding techniques for encryption.
In this screenshot you can see the C&C messages being assembled.
Zertsecurity is a simple banking Trojan which was constructed for targeting phishing attacks against German Android users. It prompts for an account number and PIN, stores them in the cfg.txt file after encrypting the information using AES and base64 encoding algorithms. It also receives SMS from a hard coded C&C server for additional instructions.
References:

Friday, December 13, 2013

Bitcoin Mining Operation Seen Across Numerous Malware Families

The talent over at Malwarebytes broke a story this week regarding Fake Flash Player phishing attempts dropping malicious content onto victim machines for the purpose of mining Bitcoins.  The threat tricks users into thinking that they are downloading a new version of Flash Player.  In actuality, the threat drops a few malicious executables (stored in "[username]/AppData/Roaming/Data"), called Control.exe and svchost.exe.  Once the threat is up and running, it communicates over a specific port for the purposes of mining Bitcoins. 

I did some digging of my own to see if there are other such instances of phishing attacks made by this threat.  I found a variant as described in MalwareBytes blog based on the dropped files and the string ".pw/blam/flashplayerv".  The end result was an additional 21 files which display similar network traffic patterns as those mentioned in the companion blog.

The network patterns which I'm matching on is any executable which makes a connection to  178[.]33[.]111[.]19 on port 9000.  I gathered packet captures for many of these threats phoning home in this way.  The results were overwhelming identical as seen below:


The conclusion we can reach is that Bitcoin mining is proving to have reached a point where it is profitable enough to be on the radar for scammers.  Administrators should take note of the traffic patterns mentioned here and monitor for similar transactions.  It should also be stated that the above list contains some still active download locations for this threat, and that the VT results can be confusing.  All of the MD5s mentioned above are detected across the board as different threats ranging from InfoStealers to Backdoor trojan droppers.  This shows that regardless of the initial focus of the malicious executable, bitcoin mining is still a profitable enough for scammers to bundle into their ill-gotten gains.

Thursday, December 5, 2013

Google Docs Scam Stealing Passwords

Scammers are up to mischief again by tricking users into clicking false webmail widgets.  The core goal of any phishing attempt is to compromise the victim's access to a particular service.  Usually this is done by posing as the service the attacker wants to hijack from the victim, and sending the username and password information back to the attacker.  I've seen plenty phishing schemes in the past but what follows is the most blatant attempt at tricking users I've ever seen.  Get ready...


Nothing says legitimacy like what must have been Adobe Reader's Myspace page layout from 2004.  Among the URL mentioned in the pic, other instances were seen as well to be related.

  • hxxp://hasanalkhalaf.com/goglefiles-docs/2013gdocs/index.htm
  • hxxp://bikecenteraracati.com.br/site/images/stories/ngdocs/login.html
  • hxxp://4mtrust.org/2013gdocs/login.htm
  • hxxp://kidneywisestp.org/kas_file/gdocs/
  • hxxp://shareddocumentation.escuelajuanadeasbaje.edu.mx/
  • hxxp://www.regnodellegno.it/tmp/sfile/googledocs/index.html
  • hxxp://www.sgp.geodezja.org.pl/warszawa/images/stories/r/doc/file.index.htm
  • hxxp://maso2.cl/wp-n/index.htm
  • hxxp://www.chuchuguazastyle.com/lord/vhyvyvvyvyvy/
  • hxxp://atcproject.ru/plugins/user/2013/2013googledocs/index.htm
  • hxxp://www.myhawkslanding.com/site/plugins/doc/file.index.htm
  • hxxp://ideid.in/olaat/gdocs/
  • hxxp://casasnogeres.com/googledocs/googledrive/google/index.htm
  • hxxp://cr-magazin.ch/cach/googledocss/googledocss/sss/
  • hxxp://www.studiobanel.com/en/wp-admin/googledocfileap/
  • hxxp://www.colerainezomba.org.uk/phpthumb/gdocs/index.htm
  • hxxp://www.atlasfernsehdienst.de/joomla/delonghi-kundendienst-muenchen.de/components/com_user/ngdocs/login.html
If you happened to click through one of these links to "Log In" with your username and password, this is what you didn't seen in the background.

Whoops
Afterwards, the victim will find that whatever option they chose will land them at Google's HomePage.  In the tested instance seen above, it was observed that the attacking site was hosted in India.

Mind your Clicks.