Showing posts with label Clear text authentication. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Clear text authentication. Show all posts

Thursday, April 2, 2015

Mobile App Wall of Shame: Wattpad


Wattpad


Price : Free
Category : Books & Reference
Platform : Android
Updated : Mar. 23, 2015
Version : 4.21
Size : 11.18 MB
Language : English
Vendor : Wattpad.com

Background:


Wattpad is the world's largest community for readers and writers and was established since 2006. Users are able to post articles, stories, fan fiction and poems about anything they like. The content includes work by undiscovered writers, published writers, new writers, or people just looking for somewhere to write all their ideas down. Users are able to comment and like stories or join different groups. Wattpad has released dedicated applications for Android, iPhone, Blackberry and iPad.


Application chart (Courtesy: Appannie, xyo.net)


Android
Global Ranking
170
Category Ranking
5 (Books & Reference)
Total number of Downloads
~42 million
Rating
4.5/5

Before using the app, a user is required to create an account in Wattpad by providing an email address and password. After creating an account they can post stories, read other user's posts, follow users and like or comment on existing content. The application also provides feature to sync Gmail, Facebook and Twitter accounts with a Wattpad account. There is also a provision to send private messages to other users from within Wattpad.

Vulnerability: cleartext username/password

Wattpad app
The current version of Wattpad for Android application has a major security issue. By analyzing the traffic during the user registration as well as the account login process, it has been observed that user credentials are being sent to the server via HTTP. Anyone who monitors the network traffic can easily get a hold of the username/password being sent to the application server and compromise the user's account. As the application permits users to buy books, an attack could also result in financial loss.
When a user tries to register for an account using the Wattpad Android application, or subsequently login, clear text user credentials as sent via an HTTP request as shown below. 






  Account registration:

[-]http://www.wattpad.com/v4/users 
Method: POST
Host: www.wattpad.com
User-Agent: Android App v4.19.17; Model: Nexus 7; Android SDK: 21; Connection: WiFi; Locale: en_US;
Request Body: type=wattpad&username=fnzscaler&password=p%40ssword123&email=vulapps%40zscaler.com&language=1&fields=token%2Cga%2Cuser%28username%2Cdescription%2Cavatar%2Cname%2Cemail%2Cverified%2Cfollower%2Cfollowing%2CbackgroundUrl%2CvotesReceived%2CnumFollowing%2CnumFollowers%2Clanguage%2Cinbox%28unread%29%2Chas_password%29
Server Response: {"token":"52708887:2129beadf9030d8725750694ec5ee4a1928dbed9891db7bfa0bc432713037a7b","user":{"username":"fnzscaler","name":"","description":"","avatar":"http:\/\/a.wattpad.com\/useravatar\/b.128.jpg","language":1,"verified":false,"votesReceived":0,"numFollowing":0,"numFollowers":0,"backgroundUrl":"","inbox":{"unread":0},"email":"vulapps@zscaler.com","has_password":true,"follower":false,"following":false},"ga":{"logged":"1","created":"20150316","group":0}}

Likewise, when an existing user tries to login, the username/password will be sent in cleartext.
Below is the traffic capture for a login session.

Login:

[-]http://www.wattpad.com/v4/sessions 
Method: POST
Host: www.wattpad.com
User-Agent: Android App v4.19.17; Model: Nexus 7; Android SDK: 21; Connection: WiFi; Locale: en_US;
Request Body: type=wattpad&username=fnzscaler&password=p%40ssword123&fields=token%2Cga%2Cuser%28username%2Cdescription%2Cavatar%2Cname%2Cemail%2Cverified%2Cfollower%2Cfollowing%2CbackgroundUrl%2CvotesReceived%2CnumFollowing%2CnumFollowers%2Clanguage%2Cinbox%28unread%29%2Chas_password%29
Server Response: {"token":"52708887:2129beadf9030d8725750694ec5ee4a1928dbed9891db7bfa0bc432713037a7b","user":{"username":"fnzscaler","name":"","description":"","avatar":"http:\/\/a.wattpad.com\/useravatar\/b.128.jpg","language":1,"verified":false,"votesReceived":0,"numFollowing":0,"numFollowers":0,"backgroundUrl":"","inbox":{"unread":0},"email":"vulapps@zscaler.com","has_password":true,"follower":false,"following":false},"ga":{"logged":"1","created":"20150316","group":0}}

ZAP Analysis:
Zap in action.
Conclusion:

The rapidly growing list of applications that do not implement even the most basic security checks makes it necessary for users to take care when accessing their accounts on public networks. It is also important important to avoid password reuse in multiple applications.

Credit - Lakshmi Devi.

Tuesday, March 17, 2015

Mobile App Wall of Shame: Shaadi.com


Shaadi.com

Price : Free
Category : Social
Platform : iOS and Android
Updated : Mar. 9, 2015 (Android), Mar. 10 2015 (iOS)
Version : 4.2.2 (Android), 4.2.1 (iOS)
Size : 8.28 MB (Android), 17.7 MB (iOS)
Language : English
Vendor : People Interactive (I) Pvt. Ltd.

Background:

Shaadi.com is the world's largest matrimonial website, active since 1995. This matrimonial site permits individuals to post their profiles and responses including horoscope, caste, language and religion. Shaadi.com provides applications designed for the two main mobile platforms – iOS and Android.

Application Chart (information retrieved from Appannie & xyo.net):



Android

iOS
Global Ranking
15
92
Category Ranking
12 (Social)
24 (Social networking)
Total number of Downloads
~1 million
 ~0.3 million
Rating
3.9/5
2.7/5

A new user is required to register by providing an email address and a password, along with basic personal details. After registering the account, the user can surf profiles created by others. The application also provides a chat facility.

Vulnerability - Cleartext username/password


Login screen

The current version of the Shaadi.com application has a serious security flaw. It has been verified that both the iOS and Android versions of the application transmit the username and password via HTTP in cleartext. This flaw allows an attacker to capture the credentials sent by a user to the application server and thus compromise the user's account, which may lead to compromise of user's personal data. The service also provides premium accounts to paid customers. 

The application was tested on both the Android and iOS platforms. The vulnerability has been confirmed on Android (v4.2.2 - latest version, updated on Mar. 9, 2015) and iOS (v4.2.1 - latest version, updated on Mar. 10, 2015).  

Vulnerability in iOS version

When a user tries to register for an account on the Shaadi.com application, an HTTP request is generated. In the request the userid, password and mobile number of the user is sent in cleartext as seen below:

Account Registration

[-]http://www.shaadi.com/registration/user/?regmode=app&OS=native-iphone
Method: POST 
Host: www.shaadi.com 
User-Agent: native-iphone|4.1.0 
Request Body: form_referral_url=&form_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.shaadi.com%2Fregistration%2Fuser%3Fregmode%3Dapp%26appver%3D4.1.0%26os%3Dnative-iphone%26deviceid%3D---%257C---&form_name=MOB_DR_SEO_REG1&frompage=From+Reg+Page&go=&olmt_home_regpage=&hid_year=&oscode=2&email=fnzscalerlnzscaler%40gmail.com&password1=p%40ssword123&postedby=Self&first_name=fnzscaler&last_name=lnzscaler&gender=Male&day=01&month=01&year=1994&community=No+Religion&mother_tongue=Konkani&countryofresidence=USA&contact_tel_number=Landline+No.

Similarly, when an already existing user tries to login to his account by providing his username and password, these credentials are also being sent in cleartext. Below is the traffic capture when a user tries to login to an existing account:

Login

[-]http://www.shaadi.com/native-apps2/user/login?email=fnzscalerlnzscaler@gmail.com&password=p@ssword123&appver=4.1.0&os=native-iphone&deviceid=---%7C--- 
Method: GET            
Host: www.shaadi.com            
User-Agent: Shaadi/462 CFNetwork/711.1.16 Darwin/14.0.0            
Server Response: {"status":"200","data":{"sid":"7B16D793AFF0443EE1320F85EFD1B4C51425446439","abc":"0CE03847FB4B0C981EB552E34E1C96B61425446522|ZSH82845405|","premium":false,"gender":"Male","age":"21","memberstatus":"ToBeScreened","memberlogin":"ZSH82845405","photograph_status":"photo_request","update_available":false,"has_notification":"N","has_chat_notification":"N","content_settings":{"eoi":"Y","acc":"Y","msg":"Y","nf1":"N","dr":"Y"},"display_name":"SH82845405","username":"SH82845405","email":"fnzscalerlnzscaler@gmail.com","use_connect":1,"upgrade_message":"UPGRADE TO PREMIUM","support_telephone":"1860-200-3456","payment_telephone":"1860-200-3456"},"expdt":"20150403002202","banner_images":{"banner_search_results":{"title":"Become a Premium Member & connect directly via","subtitle":"EMAIL, CHAT & PHONE","details":"","version":"","img":"http:\/\/img.shaadi.com\/community\/images\/app\/banner_search_results_male_free_high.png"},"banner_accepted":{"title":"Upgrade to Premium & start chatting with your Accepted Members!","subtitle":"","details":"","version":"","img":"http:\/\/img.shaadi.com\/community\/images\/app\/banner_accepted_free.png"},"banner_inbox_single":{"title":"1 Member like your profile!","subtitle":"Become a Premium member & write back to them today","details":"","version":"","img":"http:\/\/img.shaadi.com\/community\/images\/app\/banner_inbox_single_male_free_high.png"},"banner_inbox_multiple":{"title":"#count# Members like your profile!","subtitle":"Become a Premium member & write back to them today","details":"","version":"","img":"http:\/\/img.shaadi.com\/community\/images\/app\/banner_inbox_multiple_male_free_high.png"}}} 

Vulnerability in Android version

Account Registration

[-]http://www.shaadi.com/registration/user/?regmode=app&OS=native-android 

Method: POST            

Host: www.shaadi.com            

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0.2; Nexus 7 Build/LRX22G) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/37.0.0.0 Safari/537.36            

Request Body: form_referral_url=&form_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.shaadi.com%2Fregistration%2Fuser%3Fregmode%3Dapp%26os%3Dnative-android%26deviceid%3D--%7C--%26appver%3D4.1.3&form_name=MOB_DR_SEO_REG1&frompage=From+Reg+Page&go=&olmt_home_regpage=&hid_year=&oscode=1&email=vulapps%40zscaler.com&password1=p%40ssword1234&postedby=Self&first_name=fnzscaler&last_name=lnzscaler&gender=Male&day=10&month=10&year=1985&community=Spiritual+-+not+religious&mother_tongue=Marathi&countryofresidence=USA&contact_tel_number=Landline+No. 

Login

[-]http://www.shaadi.com/registration/user/login-submit 

Method: POST            

Host: www.shaadi.com            
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0.2; Nexus 7 Build/LRX22G) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/37.0.0.0 Safari/537.36            
Request Body: go=&email=vulapps%40zscaler.com&password=p%40ssword123&autologin=0&autologin=Y

ZAP analysis:
ZAP in action - Android
ZAP in action - iOS
Conclusion

The list of mobile applications in Google Play and the iTunes App Store that send out sensitive information in cleartext continues to grow. Therefore, it is extremely important to keep separate passwords for different applications and never use the password of your financial applications anywhere else.

Credit: Lakshmi Devi.

Friday, March 6, 2015

Mobile App Wall of Shame: Quikr


Quikr Local Classifieds

Quikr app logo 

Price : Free
Category : Lifestyle/Shopping
Platform : iOS and Android
Updated : February 12, 2015(Android), 22 January 2015(iOS) 
Version : 7.42(Android), 2.8.2(iOS)
Size : 3.89 MB(Android),10 MB(iOS)
Language : English
Vendor : Quikr India

Background:

Quikr is India's largest online and mobile classifieds portal. Like Craigslist, Quikr provides the users with a platform to help them buy, sell, rent and advertise across multiple categories like real estate, jobs, entertainment, education, matrimonial, etc. Quikr also has a mobile app on both the Android and iOS platforms. 


Application Chart (information retrieved from Appannie xyo.net)


Android
iOS
Overall Ranking(India)
20
90
Category Ranking(India)
5 (Shopping)
8 (Lifestyle)
Total number of Downloads
12 Million
108 Thousand 
Rating
4/5
3.5/5


A user is required to provide an email address and password when creating an account. After creating an account, the user can the post advertisements on Quikr. The application also provides functionality wherein different users can chat with each other.

Vulnerability - Clear text username/password

The current version of Quikr mobile application has a serious data leakage vulnerability. It has been verified that both the current Android and iOS versions of the application are sending username and password information via the HTTP protocol in cleartext. This security vulnerability allows an attacker on the same network to capture the credentials sent by a Quikr user to the application server and thus compromise the user's account which may lead to posting fake ads on account owner's behalf, selling and buying products and sending spam messages via chat to other users.

The flaw has been confirmed on versions 7.42 (latest versions available on Feb 12, 2015) on the Android platform and version 2.8 (latest version available on Jan 22, 2015) on the iOS platform. 




Vulnerability in iOS version

When a user tries to register for an account in the Quikr application, an HTTP request is generated as shown below. In this request, the userid, password and mobile number of the user are sent in cleartext. 

Account Registration:

[-]  Method: POST
Url: http://services.quikr.com/api?                 method=registerUser&secCode=fd1f2276c71627c35e2a9c5f8838c09c&version=1.5
Host: services.quikr.com
User-Agent: Quikr/2.8.2 CFNetwork/711.1.16 Darwin/14.0.0
Request Body:cityId=23&userId=zscalerappscan%40zscaler.com&password=password123&mobile=9876543210&demail=969eac57dbfc4079a935fadf7ab261d6%40quikr.com
Server Response: AJBiY , N , .E]n3 , i^0%] , 1}qa , K;\OU4

Similarly, below is the traffic capture when an already existing user tries to login to their account. The userid and password are passed in cleartext.

Login:

[-]  Method: POST
Url: http://services.quikr.com/api?method=login&secCode=fd1f2276c71627c35e2a9c5f8838c09c&version=1.5
Host: services.quikr.com
User-Agent: Quikr/2.8.2 CFNetwork/711.1.16 Darwin/14.0.0
Request Body: demail=969eac57dbfc4079a935fadf7ab261d6@quikr.com&userId=zscalerappscan@zscaler.com&password=password123
Server Response: 1`QaL , B*RD , , ,

Vulnerability in Android version

We will first test the Quikr application installed on a Google Nexus tablet. The Quikr application version available in the Google Play store for the tablet was v6.9. Below is the sample traffic capture when a user tries to register a new Quikr account or login to their existing Quikr account.

Account Registration:

[-]  Method: POST
Url: http://services.quikr.com/api?method=registerUser&version=1.5&secCode=zXcv80386Mdp1hs0q7o0p9uiLZV37TdF&consumerVersion=7.42&density=2.0&demail=qaf4cd1713f1f62078magnumsnip@gmail.com
Host: services.quikr.com
User-Agent: QuikrConsumer
Request Body: --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="cityId" , , 23 , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="demail" , , qaf4cd1713f1f62078magnumsnip@gmail.com , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="mobile" , , 8234567890 , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userId" , , appscan@zscaler.com , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="opf" , , json , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="password" , , p@ssword123
Server Response: {"login":{"auth":1,"code":"usercreated","message":[{"direct":"New user created"}],"email":"appscan@zscaler.com","mobile":"8234567890","city":"23","name":"","UserSession":"PGR8fU59OHVzOWMhfFI+fll0Qj5mdnIjRXd0Rm57T0dZPXw\/Q0RDYCE4amJ5L3R5PHVdTGpORSY6KDhjbl40LlliaztN","emailCRC":null,"cityName":"Bangalore","cityId":"23","app_notif_status":1,"sound_preference":1,"notif_alarmtime":"08:00 PM","userClassification":null,"isSharedPB":0,"isSharedFB":0,"userType":1,"numAlerts":0,"numAds":"0"}}

Login:

[-]  Method: POST
Url: http://services.quikr.com/api?method=login&version=1.5&secCode=zXcv80386Mdp1hs0q7o0p9uiLZV37TdF&consumerVersion=7.42&density=2.0&demail=qaf4cd1713f1f62078magnumsnip@gmail.com
Host: services.quikr.com
User-Agent: QuikrConsumer
Request Body: --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="demail" , , qaf4cd1713f1f62078magnumsnip@gmail.com , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userId" , , appscan@zscaler.com , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="opf" , , json , --s2retfgsGSRFsERFGHfgdfgw734yhFHW567TYHSrf4yarg , Content-Disposition: form-data; name="password" , , password123
Server Response: {"login":{"auth":1,"code":"success","message":[{"direct":"You are successfully logged in"}],"email":"appscan@zscaler.com","mobile":"8234567890","city":"23","name":"","UserSession":"PGR8fU59OHVzOWMhfFI+fll0Qj5mdnIjRXd0Rm57T0dZPXw\/Q0RDYCE4amJ5L3R5PHVdTGpORSY6KDhjbl40LlliaztN","emailCRC":null,"cityName":"Bangalore","cityId":"23","app_notif_status":1,"sound_preference":1,"notif_alarmtime":"08:00 PM","userClassification":"0","isSharedPB":0,"isSharedFB":0,"userType":1,"numAlerts":0,"numAds":"0"}}

As you can see in the above requests, all communication between the mobile app and server is in sent via cleartext, which includes sensitive user information.

ZAP Analysis:
ZAP in action - Android
ZAP in action - iOS
This flaw was identified using the Zscaler Application Profiler (ZAP). ZAP is a free online tool that can be used to analyze mobile applications for vulnerabilities and privacy issues as seen in the above screenshots.

Conclusion:
We continue to find new popular applications in the Apple and Google app stores that are leaking device data and sending out sensitive user information in cleartext. This is a good argument for the use of one time passwords when establishing accounts on mobile apps. As a user, you can never know with certainly if your credentials are being transmitted/stored securely. By leveraging a password manager and ensuring that passwords are unique for all apps, at least you can be assured that if your credentials are compromised due to poor app security, only that specific account will be impacted.

Credit: Lakshmi Devi.

Friday, February 20, 2015

Mobile App Wall of Shame: Tinychat for iPhone


Tinychat

Price : Free
Category : Social Networking
Updated : December 29, 2014
Version : 5.0
Size : 19.41 MB
Language : English
Vendor : Tinychat Co
Operating system : iOS

Background:

Tinychat is a group video chat application that allows users to chat online and also create their own chart rooms. Currently, this application is ranked among the top 200 apps in the Social Networking category on the iTunes app store. Tinychat claims 5 million minutes of usage per day, making it one of the largest voice and video chat communities on the Internet today.

A user must submit their email address and password in order to create an account. Alternately, a user can also use their Facebook or Twitter account to login to this application.

 Vulnerability - Clear text username/password

App Login page
The current Tinychat App (verified on Version 5.0) has a serious information leakage flaw whereby username & password information for the Tinychat user is sent in clear text (unencrypted) to the application server. This vulnerability woud make it possible for an attacker to easily sniff network traffic and compromise the user account.

Below is the sample capture of a Tinychat user login attempt. As seen in the request, the username & password information is sent in clear text.





Login:
Login Capture

Similarly, when a user attempts to register an account on Tinychat, the following HTTP request is generated. The username, password and email address information of the user passes in clear text as seen in the request below:

Account registration:
Registration Capture

An attacker can easily takeover the victim's account by sniffing the vulnerable application's network traffic. This can further lead to more sophisticated attacks and can often lead to the compromise of other applications/services due to password reuse.

ZAP Analysis:
ZAP in action.

This flaw was identified using Zscaler Application Profiler (ZAP). ZAP is a free online tool that can be used to analyze mobile applications for vulnerabilities and privacy issues as seen in the above screenshot. We have reached out to Tinychat developers, informing them of this security flaw.

Conclusion:

This type of security flaw can be uncovered by simply analyzing the network traffic sent by the application. It is disappointing to see such applications getting uploaded to Apple iTunes store without basic security tests like checking for clear text username/passwords being conducted. This is not the first time we have seen a popular iOS application with this security flaw, but Apple continues to ignore performing a basic security check as part of their vetting process for adding new applications to the app store.

Credit: Analysis by Lakshmi.

Monday, July 21, 2014

Mobile App Wall of Shame: CNN App for iPhone

Price: Free
Category: News
Updated: Jul 11, 2014
Version: Version 2.30 (Build 4948)
Size: 21.8 MB
Language: English
Vendor: CNN Interactive Group, Inc.
Operating System: iOS

Background

iReport account setting
The CNN App for iPhone is one of the most popular news applications available for the iPhone. At present, it is sitting at #2 in the iTunes free News app category and #165 among all free apps. Along with providing news stories, alerts and live video, it also includes iReport functionality, allowing users to upload photos, video and narrative to contribute to CNN news reports. The functionality includes the ability to register for an account by providing an email address, username and password. Users can optionally provide a real name and phone number. Logging into an existing iReport account or creating a new account can be accessed via More à Settings àiReport in the main menu. The user can then access the iReport Assignments section, which is accessible via This is CNNàiReport in the main Menu.



Vulnerability – Clear Text Passwords

iReport Functionality
The current CNN for iPhone App (verified on Version 2.30 (Build 4948)) has a key weakness whereby passwords for iReport accounts are sent in clear text (unencrypted). While this is always a problem, it's especially concerning that this relates to functionality which permits people to anonymously submit news stories to CNN. This occurs both when a user first creates their iReport account and during any subsequent logins. Traffic sniffed from the app using Zscaler's free ZAP tool illustrates the problem.






Initial Account Registration

[-]  Method: POST
User-Agent: CNN/4948 (iPad; iOS 7.1.2; Scale/2.00)
Request Body: nowrap=true&termsOfService=true&displayname=zscaler&password=p%40ssword&privacy=domestic_version&email=zscalertest%40zscaler%2Ecom&kaptcha=3dbgc

Subsequent Login

[-]  Method: POST
User-Agent: CNN/4948 (iPad; iOS 7.1.2; Scale/2.00)
Request Body: doSso=false&password=p%40ssword&email=zscalertest%40zscaler%2Ecom&nowrap=true
Server Response:{ , "status":"success"}

As can be seen, both transmissions are sent in clear text (HTTP) and the password (p@ssword) is sent unencrypted, along with all other registration/login information. The concern here is that anyone on the same network as the user could easily sniff the victim's password and access their account. Once obtained, the attacker could access the iReport account of the user and compromise their anonymity. The same credentials could be used to access the user's web based iReport account where any past submissions are also accessible.

ZAP Analysis:
ZAP analysis
We have tested other CNN mobile apps and found that the Android app does not have this same vulnerability as it uses both SSL encryption for registration/login and SSL certificate pinning. The iReport functionality is not present in the CNN iPad application. The vulnerability was reported to CNN on July 15th. They acknowledged receipt of the report and indicated that they are investigating.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, it isn’t difficult to identify mobile applications that send authentication credentials in clear text. As mentioned, this was easily identified in a few minutes leveraging ZAP. For end users however, such flaws aren’t as evident. In a web application, a user knows immediately when sensitive information is sent in clear text, as they don’t see the familiar lock and key symbol in their browser or HTTPS in the URL bar. Such feedback is not available in a mobile application, despite the fact that it is sending the same content. End users must rely on both the app developers and app store gatekeepers to prevent such flaws from being exposed in the first place. This vulnerability could easily have been caught by Apple during the vetting process that they subject new applications to before including them in the app store, but our research has shown us that Apple and Google simply aren’t looking for these basic security vulnerabilities.

Note:
As this issue was reported to CNN by us, CNN rolled out new updates and fix for this vulnerability. CNN app new version (2.3.1) no longer vulnerable to this issue.