Thursday, March 18, 2010

Trojan Monkif is still an active and consistent Botnet threat

While we have seen in a recent Koobface blog post showing sudden rise and fall in Koobface network activity, the Trojan Monkif’s C&C requests are still being consistently seen. According to the data, the Trojan Monkif is still highly active today and making new HTTP requests every day to pull down the additional C&C commands from the specific servers. Even though this threat is a year old, it is still present in the wild and impacting users. The Trojan Monkif makes a number of different requests to the predefined servers to collect commands, and the server responds with JPEG images encapsulating the malicious commands inside. This is used to avoid C&C command detection on the network

The functionality of Monkif is to pull out the command instructions from the remote server and download additional malware. It generates a lot of unique HTTP requests on the same server to download malicious JPEG files containing encoded commands. It also installs BHO (Browser Helper Object) on the infected machine. Interestingly, there is less of a drop for Trojan Monkif’s unique network traffic per month than Koobface. Here are the March 2010 unique web requests per day:


There are only 4-5 C&C servers seen in the requests but every request is unique containing different root directories, random “.php” files and different parameters passed to the file. The only highly active and live C&C server is hosted in Sweden with IP 88.80.7.152. Here are the servers associated with the Monkif activity:
hxxp://88.80.7.152
hxxp://www.clickspot.biz
hxxp://stats.hillmedia.biz
hxxp://cdn.cbtclick.biz
hxxp://88.80.5.3
hxxp://www.clickbig.biz
hxxp://stats.woodmedia.biz


Here is how random requests looks like,
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/tjo.php?ddddd=4x4x4x4x4x70x
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/dsiy.php?dsydm=5561671
hxxp://88.80.7.152/babymaybe/hwmcr.php?wmcrx=06166<1x644434x4x4x4x=x>
hxxp://88.80.7.152/babynot/blfp.php?dxrzz=77445=1x644413x640
hxxp://cdn.cbtclick.biz/babynot/ecccccc.php?cccc=4x4x640
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/scrhxm.php?rhxm=4x4x4x4x4x70x
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/nd.php?iy=4x4x4x4x4x70x
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/ffffffff.php?fff=4x4x4x4x4x70x
hxxp://88.80.7.152/cgi/raqfv.php?aqf=4x4x4x4x4x70x
hxxp://stats.hillmedia.biz/cgi/wl.php?rgmra==<44=46x644547x640>

As the above requests show, every request is unique, containing random data. This is done to fool IDS/IPS engines from detecting the malicious requests. The C&C server replies with Content-Type “image/jpeg” which contains JPEG image with malicious commands hidden inside. The malicious image file contains the JPEG header followed by some commands that are in encoded format. We observed by downloading some image files that first part of the command remains same and later part changes values. Here are some examples:


lppt>++<<*<4*3*516+`+`h*tlt;bh9g<4f=g=fb==1f5aefg6364a1<64fa4fe"bm`9544"5911266139|200118|2048|0|0|66

lppt>++<<*<4*3*516+`+`h*tlt;bh96efe<6600g6fbb`5<14253a4ea5=6`03"bm`9544"593300195|200057|2048|0|0|2

lppt>++<<*<4*3*516+`+`h*tlt;bh9ag=3g7a31<6<<17`7b2`b53f1`52=ff7"bm`9544"591955928|200044|2048|0|0|18


The bold text remains same in the JPEG image file and later part differs for every request – this makes detection difficult. The values within the JPEG are the malicious commands that instruct the Monkif to infect victim systems. If you compare other Botnet traffic like Koobface verses Monkif in Q1 2010, you will find that Monkif is very consistent and ongoing.

The unique network traffic for Trojan Monkif remains approximately same for each month in this quarter (March data is up to 17th). The detection for these JPEG file is zero (here is the Virustotal result for one of the C&C image files). This means you are at a greater risk from this Botnet if you are relying on only a single security protection like Antivirus.

We are near to end of Q1, 2010 and Botnet attacks remain a large threat on the web. Previously, we saw Koobface activity rise and fall, but this Monkif threat remains consistently active. The attackers behind Trojan Monkif are evading the detection by hiding their malicious Botnet commands inside JPEG files. The commands inside the JPEG files are encoded and vary, making detection more difficult for Antivirus vendors. The Virustotal result shows none of the Antivirus vendors out of 42 are detecting these malicious samples. The web is growing and so are Botnets. Currently, we are seeing only a few C&C servers being used for this Trojan, but this may increase in the future. Koobface and Monkif have been active threats in the Q1 2010, but Monkif has remained consistent. Zscaler’s solution is detecting these kinds of attacks every day. Be sure to block the above-mentioned malicious domains, and check that your security solutions are protecting you from these dangerous threats.

Be Safe!!!

Umesh

Monday, March 15, 2010

Koobface worm hits on weekend – increase in new C&C Servers

On Sunday 14th 2010, Zscaler detected a large number of Koobface worm transactions over the Internet. Koobface is a computer worm, which was first found in December 2008 and is still spreading heavily. The Koobface worm targets popular social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, etc. Once infected, the worm downloads additional malware on the user machine. It spread via sending messages to the friend list of the infected user. We have seen a lot of Koobface activity in the past where numbers of new domains are used to download malicious binaries. Yesterday, we saw an increase in network traffic of the Koobface worm to 122 unique C&C servers.

Weekends are busy social networking days for users, and the Koobface worm presumably took advantage of this. The simple scenario is described below,
The worm spreads via social engineering attack. User visits the infected friend’s profile and then clicks on the link. Then the link shows the video being displayed but shows error message like “your flash player is out of date” and you have to download new update. The innocent user clicks on the download link thinking that it is real update for flash player and ends up getting the worm on their system. We saw increase in unique C&C servers from last few days and sudden increase on Sunday. Here is the chart showing the number of unique domains used per day for last week,

Here is the list of unique C&C servers used on March 14th,

hxxp://74.217.128.97/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://85.13.206.114/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://207.217.125.50/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://75.125.232.130/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://70.35.30.26/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.139.134.203/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://82.165.204.43/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://87.106.152.181/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.96.146.81/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://89.188.141.15/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.93.192.2/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://74.63.154.248/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://207.150.212.12/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://193.93.174.152/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://212.36.74.250/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://91.186.25.40/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://85.17.169.7/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://212.227.33.27/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://212.79.87.27/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://203.206.137.137/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.52.191.187/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://206.51.236.165/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.59.147.182/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://193.227.103.20/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://193.93.174.173/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://207.150.212.23/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://195.225.168.238/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://88.208.252.192/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.9.250.162/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://200.62.54.122/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://203.116.95.196/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://204.246.156.62/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://193.227.103.44/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://216.177.193.194/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://81.223.238.227/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://80.74.152.80/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.252.239.235/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://77.95.248.53/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.167.131.16/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://77.73.98.102/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://70.35.16.246/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://213.165.76.42/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://82.165.216.103/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://65.39.133.25/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://210.193.49.224/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://68.178.254.134/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://82.165.78.116/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://64.71.33.197/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://64.71.33.74/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://8.21.33.134/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.167.131.153/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.205.36.101/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://203.146.170.138/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://80.179.155.151/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://91.121.112.18/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://63.135.106.240/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.227.177.47/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.200.55.156/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://122.201.81.28/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.9.224.210/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://96.30.24.92/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://63.247.72.82/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://203.174.82.20/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://64.71.33.35/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://212.78.89.54/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.167.183.94/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://80.196.52.177/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://65.36.242.101/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://64.118.82.32/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://82.165.218.132/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.114.220.8/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://205.234.132.8/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.63.192.22/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://88.85.75.140/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://69.10.155.198/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.109.181.217/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://81.201.129.126/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://87.118.73.178/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://91.121.216.40/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://85.158.181.27/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.141.47.21/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://194.185.27.130/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://89.106.12.55/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://83.101.16.60/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://65.89.55.2/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://89.255.9.102/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.109.138.156/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.96.146.82/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://213.171.219.195/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://216.180.225.10/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.87.242.66/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://213.189.197.30/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.223.111.166/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://212.12.112.25/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://82.165.207.69/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.167.131.131/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.82.11.2/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://94.75.226.133/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://77.72.71.43/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://87.118.67.21/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://207.150.212.89/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://85.159.63.145/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.192.124.34/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://195.225.236.90/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://94.102.219.71/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://78.46.7.50/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://67.227.223.120/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://203.98.91.195/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://194.192.14.146/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://174.37.216.1/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://208.109.181.59/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.34.43.82/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.114.200.64/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://72.47.212.35/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.132.201.41/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://74.86.229.248/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://66.7.206.75/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://174.137.158.10/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://188.240.47.29/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://75.125.238.194/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://12.68.140.207/.sys/?action=fbgen&v=103&crc=669
hxxp://209.114.220.5/.sys/?action=ppgen&a=877186281&v=103&pid=1000

Those unique IP’s are being used from different countries. And here is the top 10 among 122 unique IP’s.


Here are some of the malicious binary file names used:
v2captcha21.exe
v2bloggerjs.exe
fb.84.exe
fbcheck.exe
go.exe
v2prx.exe
fb.82.exe
pp.14.exe
v2webserver.exe
hosts2.exe
be.20.exe
tg.16.exe
ms.26.exe

Attackers are creating new variants of the Koobface worm to infect the large number of users using social networking sites. They are not only using new domains for their C&C servers, but are also taking the advantage of social networking usage over weekends. We have seen increases in social networking usage and social networking attacks over the last years. The Koobface worm has shown that once a user is infected, their social networking account can be used to easily spread malware. Zscaler’s solution prevented many types of such attacks and this again shows the importance of multiple defense mechanisms like URL filtering/Categorization, IDS/IPS, Antivirus etc.

Keep an eye on Koobface on weekends.

Umesh


Thursday, March 11, 2010

Facebook Phish and Zeus

There is an ongoing malware/phishing campaign using the Facebook brand. Here is a screenshot:

URLs take the form: http://downloads.domain.tld/id735rp/loginfacebook.php

Current domains include:
compoway.com fileserversg.com fileserverso.net
compoway.net fileserversg.net fileserverso.org
compoway.org fileserversh.com fileserversp.com
crymyway.net fileserversh.net fileserversp.net
crymyway.org fileserversi.com fileserversq.com
fileserversa.com fileserversi.net fileserversq.net
fileserversa.net fileserversj.com fileserversq.org
fileserversa.org fileserversj.net fileserversr.com
fileserversb.com fileserversj.org fileserversr.net
fileserversb.net fileserversk.com fileserversr.org
fileserversc.com fileserversk.net fileserverss.com
fileserversc.net fileserversk.org fileserverss.net
fileserversc.org fileserversl.net fileserverst.com
fileserversd.com fileserversm.com fileserverst.net
fileserversd.net fileserversm.net fileserverst.org
fileserversd.org fileserversm.org fileserversu.com
fileserverse.com fileserversn.com fileserversu.net
fileserverse.net fileserversn.net fileserversu.org
fileserversf.com fileserversn.org
fileserversf.net fileserverso.com

The domains were bulk registered through SpiritDomains, and the registration information is masked through PrivacyProtect.org. The domains currently resolve to 212.175.173.88 within TurkTelecom.

The login forms POST to:
hxxp://downloads.ersX.TLD/id735rp/page.php
where X corresponds to the last letter in the phishing domain and TLD corresponds to the phishing domain TLD. For example, the fileserverso.com phishing domain POSTs the Facebook credentials to the erso.com domain.

The IPs for these drop domains vary, e.g.,
downloads.erso.com => 209.50.243.18 (mauri.spb.ru)
downloads.ersq.com => 64.95.64.198 (lander.sitesense-oo.com)
downloads.ersr.com => 64.34.175.158 (64-34-175-158.linux-hosting.com)

In addition to having your Facebook credentials stolen, the victim is enticed to download photo.exe:


A Zeus/Zbot variant, detected by 25/42 anti-virus vendors.

Once installed, Zeus communicates with the command and controls (C&Cs) on AS 42229,
  • hxxp://91.201.196.76/daph5Nei.Keeph6ee
  • hxxp://91.201.196.75/ip.php
AS 42229 is a known Zeus network; ZeusTracker currently shows 14 C&Cs on this network.

UPDATE: I reached out to SpiritDomains abuse department, and they were very prompt about suspending the involved domains.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Recent Spike in NeoSploit Activity

Embedded malicious iFrames within ad banners on popular sites has been attributed to a recent spike in NeoSploit activity.

This week I saw a number of blocks to
google.analytics.com.[a-z]*.info domains, for example,
  • google.analytics.com.okruvgbpfyyl.info
  • google.analytics.com.poaluygbcxu.info
  • google.analytics.com.hjhcgawqijc.info
  • google.analytics.com.kfyalnkfqhl.info
  • google.analytics.com.gxycidzewmed.info

The whois information shows that these domains have now been sink-holed by ShadowServer:

Redirection to these domains appeared to have occurred from heavily obfuscated JavaScript from the domain:
adrotator.mediaplex.feed-mnptr.com (currently resolves to 188.72.252.129)

This domain is still live, and is mentioned on a few sites (Kaspersky and Google SafeBrowsing) as being malicious, but is otherwise not generally well known at the time of this analysis.

Google searches for adrotator.mediaplex.feed-mnptr.com show that the iFrame has been injected into some popular websites, for example, mtv.com, a number of msn.com sites, and a whole host of other sites (evite, cnbc, buy, juno) - reference.

Once redirected to one of the www.google.analytics.com.[a-z]*.info domains, the victim receives JavaScript from what appears to be the NeoSploit exploit kit, where the following pages may be pulled down:
  • Java exploit: class.class, Main.class
  • PDF and Browser exploits: kav6.html, kav6.php, kav6.py, kav6%20.asp, AVORP1KAV6%20.asp, kav6.exe/
  • Payload (e.g., Fake A/V): kav6.exe

Update
:
DNS-BH has a new post on 250+ Fraud, NeoSploit, etc. domains to block, and it includes the above domain mentioned: adrotator.mediaplex.feed-mnptr.com. DNS-BH also has a post listing a number of malicious domains being served on banner advertisement networks; displaying just how large a problem malicious banner ads have become.

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Are URL shorteners really dangerous?

There has been plenty of buzz about URL shorteners and security. URL shorteners have been described as a new attack vector since being popularized by social networks such as Twitter. I don't feel that URL shorteners are any more of a threat than their full length counterparts and here's why...

How URL shorteners work

The purpose of a URL shortener is to replace a log URL (e.g: http://www.zscaler.com/downloadwhitepaper_stateofweb-q4-2009.html) with a shorter one (e.g: http://bit.ly/cikl0z). When a user clicks on http://bit.ly/cikl0z, he is redirected to http://www.zscaler.com/downloadwhitepaper_stateofweb-q4-2009.html via an HTTP 301 redirection:

GET /cikl0z HTTP/1.1
Host: bit.ly

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved
Location: http://www.zscaler.com/downloadwhitepaper_stateofweb-q4-2009.html
----------------------------------------------------------
GET /downloadwhitepaper_stateofweb-q4-2009.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.zscaler.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
The browser made two requests: one to http://bit.ly/cikl0 and one to http://www.zscaler.com/downloadwhitepaper_stateofweb-q4-2009.html


Existing defense mechanisms

All the existing in-browser (Google Safe Browsing in Firefox, Opera's Fraud Protection, etc.) or external (IDS, proxy, etc.) URL scanners are applied on both the initial short and redirected long URL requests. If the long URL is a known malicious site, it will be stopped whether or not the the user clicks directly on the long URL, or on a shortened URL.

Firefox Safe Google Browsing warning on a URL after a redirection

Also, content inspection (Antivirus, Deep Packet inspection, etc.) is applied on both requests.

The use of URL shorteners and redirections does not require any new security inspection. All of the web browser security tools in place prior to the use of URL shorteners are still relevant.

Hiding the real URL

The main argument against URL shortening services is that users don't know which domain they are being redirected to. In our previous example, users see the bit.ly host name in the link address, and do not know that they will be redirected to www.zscaler.com until after they click on the link. After the redirection, the ultimate destination URL can be seen in the web browser address bar.

The long URL is displayed in the browser address bar after redirection

How many people know the difference between a good URL and a bad URL? Even then, how can anyone be sure that a site won't serve malicious content. Many perfectly legitimate websites (Redcross, Indian Governmental websites, etc.) have been hacked and can contain an infamous hidden iframe to spread malware. Well-known websites are no longer necessarily safer than unknown or new sites. Simply using the reputation of the hostname for deciding whether a URL is safe or not is not a good idea.

In a post Michael wrote a year ago, he checked 100,000 TinyURL (URL shortener service) urls. He did not find any link to a malicious executable, no phishing sites, and really few redirections to malicious content.

I believe the danger of URL shorteners has been overblown, mainly based on the idea that individuals are in a position to determine if a website is dangerous or not simply by looking at the final URL. Users are far better off relying on antivirus, URL blacklists and regular browser updates for security. And these tools work just fine or shortened URLs as well.

- Julien